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continue to challenge the statute the
United States is using to prosecute
Guantánamo detainees, arguing that it
is an illegal ex post facto law. And just
last year, Paradis obtained legal relief for
a Guantánamo detainee after arguing
that the military judge was biased.
To be sure, the legal landscape for
military justice has changed since
Sawada. On the heels of World War II,
the international community expanded
the judicial protections in the Geneva
Conventions and Congress passed the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. These
changes tethered military tribunals
to widely accepted legal standards,
which steadily enhanced their judicial
character over the next several decades.
Do the military commissions at
Guantánamo honor that tradition or
resurrect the same types of injustices
the Doolittle Raiders faced at the hands
of their Japanese captors? Last Mission
to Tokyo is a must-read book within the
national-security community, especially
for people trying to place the current
military commissions at Guantánamo
in historical and legal context.

professional. It is a literary rarity, boasting exceptional scholarship, clear
arguments, and a writing style so
sure and compelling that the reader
is both disappointed and surprised
to finish the last of its 670 pages.
Nolan examines what might be termed
the cult of the decisive battle that
leads to sharp, quick victory, as well
as the near-mythical reverence that
military scholars afford to commanders
who emerge victorious from such
conflicts. While acknowledging that
decisive battles can happen, Nolan then
convincingly demonstrates that such
battles are rare, and many (if not most)
battles thought to have been decisive
were not. He argues that wars very
rarely are won in such fashion; rather,
they are grinding contests of strength,
attrition, and force that, as warfare
has evolved, increasingly exhaust
the victors and destroy the losers.

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have
Been Won and Lost, by Cathal J. Nolan. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017. 670 pages. $25.

The fact that some wars have been won
quickly—by great leaders who either created or benefited from the rare decisive
battle or quick campaign—has had a
pernicious effect on the evolution of military thought and culture. The so-called
cult of the offensive may have reached its
high-water mark in 1914, but it had been
building for centuries and still survives
to the present day. In contrast, as Nolan
points out, the benefits of defensive
strategies, of the careful husbanding of
troops and resources, rarely are extolled.

From first page to last, The Allure of
Battle is a remarkable, exceptional work.
Already gathering awards—notably,
the Gilder Lehrman Prize, recognizing
“the best book on military history in the
English-speaking world”—Nolan’s book
should be read by every serious student
of military history, as well as every
military officer and national-security

Nolan’s position puts him in direct
contradiction with canonical theorists
of war, including Carl von Clausewitz
and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Both argued
for the need to create the conditions
for victory through a decisive major
engagement. Criticizing these masters
guarantees that intellectual battle lines
will be drawn. The Allure of Battle then
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goes further when it depicts Napoléon
as the man who doomed France by
relying on ever-diminishing tactical and
operational success instead of creating
a long-term strategy to preserve and
strengthen his state. Napoléon had a
remarkable ten-year run, and at one
point truly was the master of Europe, but
his lack of strategic vision and planning
cost him his armies and his crown,
and devastated France in the process.
Weaker states have been drawn to the
chimera of the fast win, because their
leaders know it is their only chance,
however long the odds, of winning at
all. In other cases, initial success may
obscure a stark reality for a time, as
when the Japanese fleet roared across
the Pacific and German armored
divisions sliced through Europe in the
early 1940s. Nevertheless, Nolan argues
that German and Japanese leaders
knew, well before 1943, that their wars
were lost; the Allies’ industrial might
and resolve to stay in the fight signaled
an eventual, inevitable Axis defeat.
Although the book is a gem, there are
areas for small improvements. Despite
its look at the wars of Japan, the work is
self-admittedly Eurocentric. Coverage
of the U.S. Civil War is all but absent,
and there is not one mention of the
wars of South America—in particular,
the War of the Pacific, the War of the
Triple Alliance, and the Chaco War.
The omission is felt more keenly as the
history of these wars supports Nolan’s
thesis. Also missing is a serious look
at the centuries of colonial wars in
which there were many decisive battles,
and their potential impact on the
ideal of the quick win. It is deceptively
easy—but wrong—to dismiss these wars
as sideshows. Expanding the scope of
the book beyond the shores of Europe
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obviously would entail additional
chapters, but readers willing to invest in
nearly seven hundred pages of material
would not balk at a few hundred more.
Nolan also could have spent more time
examining when a strategy based on
decisive battle and a quick campaign
actually resulted in victory. He does
look at some cases, such as the German
victory in the Franco-Prussian War and
Frederick the Great’s conquest of Silesia,
but only to show that those conflicts
were not the avatars of decisive victory
that the victors and history made them
out to be. Conversely, although he
extols the virtues of more-defensive
strategies, more material on when and
where they worked would be welcome.
It would be grossly unfair to end this review on a negative note, however slight.
The Allure of Battle is a great book. Destined to be a classic, it is a welcome and
necessary addition to our understanding
of military history. It is also a great
read—exciting, engaging, and evocative.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Nimitz at Ease, by Michael A. Lilly. Apache Junction, AZ: Stairway, 2019. 367 pages. $29.95.

One of Chester Nimitz’s staff members,
interviewed in 1969, suggested that
“[i]t’s so easy to write about a man who
swings wildly when he’s on the quarterdeck of a ship, but Nimitz had to pull
together the pieces of a terribly riven
situation . . . , and these aren’t the things
that make exciting reading.” (See James
Bassett, oral history, Nimitz Library
Special Collections, U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, MD, p. 9). As a result, this
staff officer concluded, a biography of
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